A discrete time two-nation arms race model involving a piecewise constant nonlinear control function is formulated and studied. By elementary but novel arguments, we are able to give a complete analysis of its asymptotic behavior when the threshold parameter in the control function varies from 0 to ∞. We show that all solutions originated from positive initial values tend to limit one or two cycles. An implication is that when devastating weapons are involved, "terror equilibrium" can be achieved and escalated race avoided. It is hoped that our analysis will provide motivation for further studying of discrete-time equations with piecewise smooth nonlinearities.
Introduction
In 1, pages 87-90 , a simple dynamical model of a two-nation arms race based on Richardson's ideas in 2 is explained, and several interesting conclusions are drawn which can be used to explain stable and escalated arms races. Roughly, let N {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and let A n and B n be the amount spent on armaments by two respective countries A and B in year n ∈ N. Assuming, A has a fixed amount of distrust of the other country, causing it to retain arms, then Under the assumption that r A r B r and s A s B s, it is shown that if the initial total expenditure A −1 B −1 is large and that the distrust factor is also so large that s > r, then no two countries can sustain exponentially increasing expenditures on arms, and the alternative is war or negotiation. While this model is an oversimplification one, it could help to understand plausible reasons behind World War I see 2, 3 in which various aspects of arms race modeling are discussed .
The above model cannot explain some of the observations we can make nowadays. Therefore, we need to build various models and analyze their asymptotic behaviors. In this paper, we will build one such model based on the idea that although the distrust factor is the same as in the previous model, the expenditure by the other country in year n − 1 in 1.1 is replaced by s A f λ B n−1 where
1.3
and the term A n−1 in 1.2 is replaced by a similar one. The "discontinuous" function f λ has a clear physical meaning. Indeed, the positive parameter λ may be treated as a cutoff threshold indicator so that when the competitor is already spending an unreasonable amount of money such as stocking of hundreds of nuclear missiles that can annihilate our mother earth or is not spending any, there is no need to add the budget anymore. With this function at hand, we may rewrite our new model as follows:
x n ax n−α bf λ y n−1 c, y n ry n−β sf τ x n−1 t,
where we have introduced two "delays" α and β in order to reflect the fact that the expenditure in a previous accounting period may not be recorded precisely, and hence historical expenditure records may be more reliable for use in making future decisions. Although 1.4 may seem to be a simple model, there are still too many parameters involved. We therefore make further reasonable assumptions as follows:
The assumption that c, t 0 means that the fixed expenditures are relatively low in both countries, while we assume that α β 2 so as to use the best up-to-date and "reliable" accounting records x n−2 and y n−2 . By choosing a ∈ 0, 1 and b 1 − a, country A is making a decision based on a convex combination of the expenditures x n−2 and the blanket-ceiling sum f λ y n−1 . If country B takes on a similar decision policy, then we end up with
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society   3 where a * may or may not differ from a. The case a * / a is only more technically difficult, and therefore, in this paper, we will assume the case a a * which is already nontrivial as we will see so that both countries play "symmetric" roles in the interactions.
By adopting these assumptions, we then settle on the following dynamical system:
for n ∈ N, where in this model, a ∈ 0, 1 , λ > 0. Note that if we let z x, y and
then the above system 1.7 can be written as
where we write z n x n , y n and a 1 − a for the sake of convenience. The above vector equation is a three-term recurrence relation. Hence, for given z −2 and z −1 in the plane, a unique sequence {z k } ∞ k −2 can be calculated from it. Such a sequence is called a solution of 1.9 determined by z −2 and z −1 . Among different z −2 and z −1 , those lying in the positive quadrant are of special interests since expenditures are always positive. Therefore, our subsequent interests are basically the asymptotic behaviors of all such solutions determined by z −2 and z −1 with positive components.
We remark that system 1.9 can be regarded as a discrete dynamical system with piecewise smooth nonlinearities. Such systems have not been explored extensively see, e.g., the discussions on "polymodal" discrete systems in 4 , and there are only several recent studies on scalar equations with piecewise smooth nonlinearities 5-9 ! Therefore, a complete asymptotic analysis of our equation is essential in the further development of discontinuous in particular, polymodal discrete time dynamical systems.
We need to be more precise about the statements to be made later. To this end, we first note that given any z −2 , z −1 in the quadrant 0, ∞ 2 , the solution {z n } ∞ n−2 determined by it also lies in the same quadrant in the sense that z n ∈ 0, ∞ 2 for n ∈ N . Depending on the locations of z −2 and z −1 , it is clear that the behavior of the corresponding solution may differ. For this reason, it is convenient to distinguish various parts of the first quadrant in the following manner:
where λ is a fixed positive number, then
is a partition of the quadrant 0, ∞ 2 .
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Note that these subsets depend on λ, but this dependence is not emphasized in the sequel for the sake of convenience.
For any solution {z n } ∞ n −2 originated from z −2 and z −1 in the above subsets, our main conclusion in this paper is that {z 2n } will tend to some vector u and {z 2n 1 } will tend to another vector v which may or may not be equal to u . This implication is important since it says that escalated arms race cannot happen and World War III should not happen if our model is correct! For the sake of convenience, we record this fact by means of
In case u v, {z n } is convergent to u, and hence we may also write
To arrive at our main conclusion, we note, however, that since f λ is a discontinuous function, the standard theories that employ continuous arguments cannot be applied to yield asymptotic criteria. Fortunately, we may resort to elementary arguments as to be seen below.
Before doing so, let us make a few remarks. First, note that our system 1.9 is autonomous time invariant and also symmetric in the sense that under two sets of "symmetric initial conditions," the behaviors of the corresponding solutions are also "symmetric." This statement can be made more precise in mathematical terms. However, a simple example is sufficient to illustrate this: suppose that λ 1. If {z n } ∞ n −2 is a solution of 1.9 with z −2 , z −1 ∈ A × B, then as will be seen below, z 2n → 1, 0 and z 2n 1 → 1, 1 . If we now replace the condition z −2 , z −1 ∈ A × B with the symmetric initial condition z −2 , z −1 ∈ A×D, then we will end up with the conclusion that z 2n → 0, 1 and z 2n 1 → 1, 1 . Such two conclusions will be referred to as dual results. We will see some tables which contain some obvious dual results later.
Next, by 1.8 , we may easily see that
Therefore, in case {z k } is a solution of 1.9 such that, say, z k ∈ A for all large k, then 1.9 is reduced to z n az n−2 a k, 1.16 for all large n. Hence, linear systems and their related properties will also appear in later discussions. More precisely, two groups of bounding quantities α j and β j are needed:
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Note that they satisfy α 0 β 0 λ and the recurrence relations
We also need the following two properties of linear systems. Let {x k } ∞ k −2 be real scalar or vector sequences that satisfy
1.19
where a ∈ 0, 1 , and d is a real number resp., a real vector .
i If {x n } ∞ n −2 is a sequence which satisfies 1.19 , then
ii If {x n } ∞ n −2 is a sequence which satisfies 1.20 , then
Finally, we need to consider various ordering arrangements for three or four nonnegative integers k, p, l, and m. First, the ordering arrangements of three integers k, p, and l can be classified into 6 cases:
c a or c ∈ a, ∞ .
1.23
These are equivalent to A, B, C, or D and discuss the precise asymptotic behaviors of the corresponding solutions determined by them.
The Case λ > 1
This case is relatively simple.
Proof. By 1.9 , we may see that x n ≤ ax n−2 a and y n ≤ ay n−2 a for n ∈ N, then lim n x n ≤ 1 < λ and lim n y n ≤ 1 < λ. Thus, there exists an integer m such that z k , z k 1 ∈ 0, λ 2 for all k ≥ m. Therefore, z k 2 az k a k for all k ≥ m. In view of 1.21 and 1.22 , z n → k. The proof is complete.
The Case λ 1
In this section, we assume that λ 1. If {z k } ∞ k −2 is a solution of 1.9 and if z k ∈ A and z k 1 ∈ 0, ∞ 2 , then in view of 1.14 , F λ z k 1 ∈ {i, j, k, 0}, and hence
By similar reasoning, we may consider all other possible cases and collect our findings in tables. To simplify the description of these tables, we first note that {β j } ∞ j 0 {1/a j } ∞ j 0 is a strictly increasing and divergent sequence. Therefore, if we let
First of all, the fact that z k ∈ A and z k 1 ∈ A implies, z k 2 ∈ A is recorded as the A, A entry in Table 1 . In this table, we may also find other entries which are self-explanatory. Table 2 Initial condition Condition Conclusion 
By similar considerations, we may also obtain Tables 1 and 2. For instance, let us show the third data row in Table 2 . Suppose that z −2 ∈ B k and z −1 ∈ D p , where 0 ≤ k ≤ p. By Table 1 , if 0 k ≤ p, then
8
3.5
and by induction,
that is, z 2k ∈ A and z 2k 1 ∈ D.
As another example, let us show the second data row in Table 3 . Suppose that 
If 0 < k < min{l, m, p}, then
that is, z 2k ∈ D p−k−1 and z 2k 1 ∈ C l−k−1,t for some t ∈ N. By means of the information obtained so far, let {z n } ∞ n −2 be a solution of 1.9 , we will be able to show the following result. 
To this end, let us consider first the case where z −2 , z −1 ∈ A × A, then by the A, A entry in Table 1 , z 0 ∈ A. By induction, we may then see that z k ∈ A for all k ≥ −2. Hence, by 1.9 , we see that
from which we easily obtain
3.12 By 1.21 and 1.22 , we see that z 2k , z 2k 1 → k so that z n → k. We record this conclusion in the A, A entry of Table 4 . Consider another case where z −2 ∈ A and z −1 ∈ B j . Then by the A, B j entry of Table 1 , we see that z 0 ∈ A. Since z −1 ∈ B j and z 0 ∈ A, then by Table 1 again,
for some i ∈ N. By induction, we may then see that z 2k ∈ A and z 2k 1 ∈ B for k ≥ −1. Hence, by 1.9 , we see that
for n ∈ N. We may then easily see that z 2n → i and z 2n 1 → k. Table 4 . To see why the other entries are correct, we consider a typical case where z −2 ∈ B i and z −1 ∈ D s for some i, s ∈ N. Suppose that 0 ≤ i ≤ s. By Table 2 , z 2i ∈ A and z 2i 1 ∈ D. Hence by the A, D entry in Table 4 , we see that z 2k → j and z 2k 1 → k. While if 0 ≤ s < i, then z 2s ∈ B and z 2s 1 ∈ A. Hence, by the B, A entry in Table 4 , we see that z 2k → k and z 2k 1 → i.
10
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4.1
We denote
4.3
In Table 5 , we record the fact that z α ∈ B and z α 1 ∈ B which implies z α 2 ∈ B as the B, B entry, and so forth. Tables 6 and 7 are similar to Tables 2 and 3. For example, let us show the first data row in Table 6 . Suppose that z −2 ∈ C λ,p and z −1 ∈ B m,λ where 0 ≤ p ≤ m. Then by Table 5 , if 0 p ≤ m,
4.4 Table 6 Initial condition Table 7 : Table 9 Table 10 Initial incorporates real strategic thinking, with sound foundation in decision theory and game theory see, for instance, 10-12 . Yet to the best of our knowledge, there is no complete mathematical analysis similar to those described above. We hope that our results will be useful in furthering the mathematical investigation of arms race models based on more recent and realistic social models.
